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Abstract—This paper presents security mechanisms for router
and link admittance control in OLSRv2. Digitally signing OL-
SRv2 control messages allows recipient routers to – individually
– choose to admit or exclude the originating router for when
populating link-state databases, calculating MPR sets etc. By
additionally embedding signatures for each advertised link,
recipient routers can also control admittance of each advertised
link in the message, rendering an OLSRv2 network resilient to
both identity-spoofing and link-spoofing attacks.
The flip-side of the coin when using such a link-admittance
mechanism is, that the number of signatures to include in each
OLSRv2 control message is a function of the number of links
advertised. For HELLO messages, this is essentially the number
of neighbor routers, for TC messages, this is the number of MPR
Selectors of the originator of the message. Also, upon receipt
of a control message, these signatures are to be verified. This
paper studies the impact of adding a link-admittance control
mechanism to OLSRv2, both in terms of additional control-traffic
overhead and additional in-router processing resources, using
several cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography for very short signatures.
Index Terms—OLSRv2, MANET, security, router, link admit-
tance control, digital signatures
I. INTRODUCTION
Network integrity in routed networks is largely preserved by
physically controlling access to the communications channel
between routers: know thy peers, trust thy peers — and be able
to disconnect thy peers if they are not worthy of the trust, e.g.
if the topology they present does not match expectations, i.e.,
routing integrity is protected by admitting only trusted peers,
assuming that these, once admitted, are well behaving.
In a MANET (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork), often operated
over wireless interfaces, this is less obvious: physical access
to the media between routers is not delimited by a cable, but
is available to anyone within transmission range; the network
topology is time-varying, either due to router mobility or due
to time-varying characteristics of the channel – consequently,
determining that a peer does not present an “expected topol-
ogy” and subsequently “disconnecting” it is difficult. As such,
MANETs do not introduce particularly new security issues
for routing protocols, but rather render existing security issues
easier to exploit and, therefore, require re-examining counter-
measures for routing protocol resilience.
A. OLSRv2 Overview
The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2
(OLSRv2) [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] is a successor to the widely
deployed OLSR [6] routing protocol for MANETs. OLSRv2
retains the same basic algorithms as its predecessor, however
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Fig. 1. Basic OLSRv2 operation.
offers various improvements, e.g. a modular and flexible
architecture allowing extensions, such as for security, to be
developed as add-ons to the basic protocol. OLSRv2 contains
three basic processes: Neighborhood Discovery, MPR Flood-
ing and Link State Advertisements. The basic operation of
OLSRv2 is illustrated in figure 1. Ignoring the gray router X,
the different elements of OLSRv2, the processes for Neighbor-
hood Discovery, MPR Flooding, and Link State Advertisement,
are detailed below. This is followed by a description of the
flexible message format used by OLSRv2, as well as the
inherent extensibility specifically enabling extensions such as
those developed in this paper.
1) Neighborhood Discovery: The process, whereby each
router discovers the routers which are in direct communication
range of itself (1-hop neighbors), and detects with which
of these it can establish bi-directional communication. Each
router sends HELLOs, listing the identifiers of all the routers
from which it has recently received a HELLO, as well as the
“status” of the link (HEARD, verified bi-directional – called
SYM). A router a receiving a HELLO from a neighbor b in
which b indicates to have recently received a HELLO from a
considers the link a-b to be bi-directional. As b lists identifiers
of all its neighbors in its HELLO, a learns the “neighbors of its
neighbors” (2-hop neighbors) through this process. HELLOs
are sent periodically, however certain events may trigger non-
periodic HELLOs.
2) MPR Flooding: The process whereby each router is
able to, efficiently, conduct network-wide broadcasts. Each
router designates, from among its bi-directional neighbors,
a subset (MPR set) such that a message transmitted by the
router and relayed by the MPR set is received by all its 2-hop
neighbors (i.e., the MPR set “covers” all 2-hop neighbors).
MPR selection is encoded in outgoing HELLOs. The set of
routers having selected a given router as MPR is the MPR-
selector-set of that router. A study of the MPR flooding
algorithm can be found in [7].
3) Link State Advertisement: The process whereby routers
are determining which link state information to advertise
through the network. Each router must advertise links between
itself and its MPR-selector-set, in order to allow all routers
to calculate shortest paths. Such link state advertisements,
carried in TC messages, are broadcast through the network
using the MPR Flooding process. As a router selects MPRs
only from among bi-directional neighbors, links advertised in
TCs are also bi-directional. TC messages are sent periodically,
however certain events may trigger non-periodic TCs. In order
to be able to discriminate between fresh and stale information,
Link State Advertisements, emitted by a given router, include
a sequence number incremented each time that router changes
the set of links advertised.
4) Flexible Message Format: OLSRv2 employs the format
specified in [2], for all protocol messages. This format enables
scope-limited message flooding by way of <hop-limit>
and <hop-count> message header fields, modified each
time a message is forwarded. The message body format
enables compact (aggregated) address representation, also of
non-contiguous network addresses, by way of address blocks,
and has the ability to associate any number of arbitrary
attributes to each such address, by way of inclusion of Type-
Length-Value objects (TLVs), referencing the address to which
they correspond. Such TLVs are denoted “Address Block
TLVs”1. An example of an attribute that may be associ-
ated with an address in OLSRv2, is Link Status = SYM
in HELLOs, to indicate that a link between the originator
of the message and the indicated address has been verified
to be bi-directional. Another example of such an attribute,
associated by an OLSRv2 router to specific addresses in
HELLO messages is an MPR TLV, indicating a router’s MPR
selection.
Furthermore, the message body can contain any number of
arbitrary attributes not specifically associated to any address,
this also by way of inclusion of TLVs. Such TLVs are denoted
“Message TLVs”. An example of an attribute that may be
included in a message in OLSRv2, and which is not associated
with any address, is the sequence number included in TCs.
The TLV structure permits any given message to be parsed
correctly by allowing an implementation to “skip over” TLVs
not recognized, thus enabling extensions to be developed that
embed information into existing OLSRv2 control messages.
5) Inherent Protocol Extensibility: [4], [5] are conceived
to enable protocol extensions to be developed for OLSRv2.
This is, in addition to the message format described above,
accomplished by allowing that subsequent to the usual control
message (HELLO and TC) generation, outgoing messages can
be handed off to a protocol extension for further processing.
Amongst other things, such an extension can insert addresses,
Address Block TLVs and Message TLVs. Moreover, upon
receipt of a control message, and prior to the usual processing
according to that message type, incoming messages can be
processed by a protocol extension – including processing
of information from that message (extension specific TLVs,
for example), as well as allowing a protocol extension to
1In order to avoid repetition of attributes, an Address Block TLV can
reference a single, a range or all addresses in a given address block, see [2]
for details.
identify the received message as malformed, and thus prohibit
processing of that message by OLSRv2.
B. OLSRv2 Vulnerability Taxonomy
As link state protocol, OLSRv2 assumes that (i) each
router can acquire and maintain a topology map, accurately
reflecting the effective network topology; and (ii) that the
network converges, i.e. that all routers in the network will have
sufficiently identical topology maps. Network connectivity can
be disrupted by causing either of these assumptions to not
hold, specifically (a) routers may be prevented from acquiring
a topology map of the network; (b) routers may acquire a
topology map, which does not reflect the effective network
topology; and (c) two or more routers may acquire inconsistent
topology maps.
In OLSRv2, this translates into that: (i) the links designated
by HELLOs to be advertised in TCs reflect actual links in
the network; (ii) that the TCs advertise these actual links; and
(iii) that TCs are correctly relayed, i.e. that the MPR flooding
process operates correctly. [8] provides a detailed security
analysis of OLSRv2, observing how, and with which conse-
quences, a disruptive attack might be conducted against an
OLSRv2 network. A common, and not surprising, observation
from [8] is, that identity spoofing and link spoofing, i.e., that a
router in its control traffic either pretends to have the identity
of another router or pretends to have (non-existing) links to
another router, are major vectors for disruptive attacks on an
OLSRv2 network.
C. Problem Statement
Returning to figure 1, router a selects b as MPR in order
to cover c. Router b, therefore, advertises the link b-a in TCs,
throughout the network. If a malicious router, X (gray circle)
is a neighbor of a and spoofs the identity of c (more generally,
of all neighbors of b), then a will not select b as MPR. This
has as consequences that (i) b will not advertise b-a; and (ii)
the MPR flooding process is disrupted: TCs transiting through
a will not be relayed by b to reach the right-hand side of
the network. This is an illustration of the effect of identity
spoofing.
A possible countermeasure to such an identity spoofing at-
tack is for a protocol extension to admit only control messages
originating from routers, whose identity can be verified to not
be spoofed, for processing by OLSRv2 – router admittance
control.
Router admittance control assumes a transitive trust rela-
tionship between routers: d receiving a TC from b declaring a
link b-a, and which d (by way of a router admittance control
protocol extension) is able to verify was indeed sent from b,
will have to trust that b is correctly behaving (i.e., has not been
compromised) and that b has properly verified the identity of
a (the “other end of the link”, advertised in the TCs received
from b) as well as the properties associated herewith. Router
admittance control does not permit the recipient of a TC to
verify that the content of the TC is valid.
Still in figure 1, should b be malicious or compromised,
but still in possession of credentials to generate TCs which
pass verification by a router admittance protocol extension, it
might in its TCs also advertise a fictitious link b-d. c would
receive this and, thus, transit traffic destined for d via b, rather
than through “to the right” to where d is located. This is an
illustration of the effect of link spoofing.
A possible countermeasure to such a link spoofing attack is
for a protocol extension to admit only links, where it can be
verified by the recipient that both ends have “signed off” for
the existence of that link – link admittance control.
D. Paper Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II describes a basic router admittance control mechanism
for OLSRv2. Section III introduces a link admittance control
mechanism, allowing per-link verification without assuming
transitive trust, also for OLSRv2. Section IV provides a
specification of the protocol extension, notably the TLVs and
their content, necessary for enabling router and link admittance
control, and how the proposed extensions integrate into the
OLSRv2 protocol architecture. As the protocol extensions
proposed in this paper rely on cryptographic signatures, sec-
tion V briefly discusses the applicability of shared and public
key cryptographic systems for this purpose, and section VI
discusses the use of timestamps in the protocol extensions
proposed. Section VII studies the performance of the proposed
security mechanisms, with particular emphasis on (i) control
traffic overhead incurred, and (ii) additional in-router resource
requirements, as a consequence of these security mechanisms.
This paper is concluded in section VIII.
II. ROUTER ADMITTANCE CONTROL
Router admittance control in OLSRv2 is enabled in [4], [5]
by allowing a protocol extension to, upon receipt of a control
message and prior to the usual processing hereof, determine
if the message originates from a router using a “spoofed
identity”. Thus, each router must be able to include sufficient
credentials in each control message to allow a recipient to
make such a determination.
To this end, this paper assumes that (i) each router identity
(IP address) is also associated with a cryptographic key, (ii)
this key is used for generating and including a cryptographic
signature in each outgoing control message, and (iii) that this
signature is verified by a receiving router, prior to the control
message being processed by OLSRv2. The cryptographic
signature is carried in control messages by way of a TLV,
specified in section IV.
More precisely, for router admittance control, each router
will, for each outgoing control message:
• calculate sign(ownID, TimeStamp, <msg>);
where <msg> is the control message, including all head-
ers, but with the mutable fields <hop-limit> and
<hop-count> (if present) set to zero, and TimeStamp
is current at the time of signature generation;
• add this signature, as well as TimeStamp, by way of a
Signature-TLV and Timestamp-TLV (section IV), to the
control message.
Each router will, for each incoming control message and
prior to it being delivered to OLSRv2 for processing:
• verify the included Signature-TLV;
• consider the message as malformed (and, thus, prohibit
its processing by OLSRv2) if either of:
– no Signature-TLV is present in the received message;
– the verification fails, i.e. the signature does not
correspond to the message originator and content;
– if clocks are synchronized and Replay Attacks are
of concern, the included TimeStamp is “too old”
(refer also to section VI).
• otherwise, consider the message as correctly formed
according to the Router Admittance Control protocol
extension.
If a message is so considered “correctly formed”, it implies
that the originator of the message either is not “spoofing” its
identity – or, that the originator has managed to acquire the
credentials, necessary for generating a signature corresponding
to a spoofed identity.
III. FINE-GRAINED SECURITY:
LINK ADMITTANCE CONTROL
In order to allow a router receiving a control message to
verify “both sides” of the link, (i) both sides must be able
to establish that the link exists, and (ii) information “signing
off” for this must be included in the control message. The TLV
format in [2] enables that that information can be associated
with each address, advertised in a control message.
For each address (the other end of the link) advertised
in a control message, the originating router includes a
signature embedding its own address, the address of
the peer, the timestamp of emission, and any additional
attributes that the originating router has associated with
that link, by way of TLV inclusion, e.g., if the link is
HEARD or SYM (for HELLO messages) or if an address is
routable (for TC messages). The signature so included is, thus:
sign(t, ownID, peerID, own-attribute-list).
The router also signs the message as described in section II,
thus notably including its own timestamp in the message
as well. Additionally, the router includes the most recent
signature previously received for this link from the peer, the
corresponding timestamp received from the peer, as well as
the attribute list for this link received from the peer (i.e., the
information which the peer used for calculating the signature).
A router receiving such a message can, then, verify if (i) the
two routers agree on the attributes associated with the link,
and (ii) do so at approximately the same time2.
Consider the example depicted in figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Example of link admittance control in the Neighborhood Discovery
process of OLSRv2: attributes listed in “boxes” are those received from the
“peer” in a previous HELLO message.
2Timestamps are included to counter replay attacks. Using timestamps
requires roughly synchronized system clocks. A similar mechanism using
nonces could be possible, when clocks are not assumed to be synchronized.
At t0, router a sends a HELLO; it has no neighbors and
thus the HELLO is empty. When b receives this HELLO, it
will – as usual in OLSRv2 – advertise a as HEARD in its
next HELLO, at t1 and associate its signature sign(t1, b,
a, HEARD) to this advertisement, by way of a TLV. Any
router receiving this HELLO can verify only that b claims
information about the link a-b.
At t2, router a will proceed in a similar fashion, advertising
b as SYM, associating its own signature sign(t2, a, b,
SYM). The router will also include the information shown in-
side the “box”: the last received signature for this link, received
from b, sign(t1, b, a, HEARD), and the information
necessary for a third-party to be able to verify the signature
of b: the timestamp t1, and the attribute list corresponding to
this link as received from b (HEARD). Any router receiving
this HELLO can by verifying the signatures observe that a
and b at this point have claimed different information about a
(a describes the link as SYM, b describes it as HEARD).
At t3, router b may consider advertising a as SYM, and
associating its own signature sign(t3, b, a, SYM). The
router will also include the information shown inside the
“box”: the last received signature for this link, received from
a, sign(t2, a, b, SYM) and the information necessary
for a third-party to be able to verify the signature of a: the
timestamp t2, and the attribute list corresponding to this link
as received from a (SYM). Any router receiving this HELLO
can by verifying the signatures observe that at t2 and t3,
respectively, both a and b have claimed claimed that the link
a-b is symmetric. If t2 and t3 are sufficiently close, a recipient
may conclude that a symmetric link exists between a-b, and
that both a and b have “signed off” herefore. The link can
therefore be considered as “trusted”, and thus reflected in the
link- and neighbor-sets of OLSRv2.
The main impact, in terms of protocol operation, is that
if link admittance control is used when admitting routers to
the 2-hop set, then one further HELLO message exchange is
required in order for a router to be able to detect 2-hop links
as “signed off” as symmetric by both ends.
IV. PROTOCOL EXTENSION SPECIFICATION:
ROUTER AND LINK ADMITTANCE CONTROL
In the following, the router and link admittance control
protocol extension, proposed by this paper, is specified, in
particular the TLV types introduced, as well as the interaction
between this protocol extension and OLSRv2.
A. TLV Specification
Three TLVs are required: a timestamp TLV, a signature
TLV and an attributes TLV. The timestamp TLV and the
signature TLV, both, can be used as Message TLVs (i.e.
included in the header of a control message) and as Address
Block TLVs (i.e. associated with one or more addresses in
the message body). This section specifies the content of
<value> in the three proposed TLVs, for use in the format
described in [2].
1) Timestamp TLV:
<timestamp> := <time-value>
where: <time-value> contains the timestamp. A timestamp
is essentially “freshness information”, and may e.g. correspond
to a UNIX-timestamp, GPS timestamp or a simple sequence
number. For the performance study of section VII, the
timestamp is a four-byte long integer, counting the seconds
from the start of the simulation.
2) Signature TLV:
<sign-tlv> := <hash-fkt><sign_algo><sign>
where: <hash-fkt> and <sign_algo> are 1-octet long
fields identifying the choice of hash function and signature
algorithm, respectively, and <sign> contains the digital
signature.
3) Attributes TLV:
<attributes> := {<attribute-value>}*
Recalling that for each address included in a message, two
signatures are ultimately included. If the message is originated
by router a and contains an address of a peer b, then for the
link a-b a signature generated by both a and b is included.
In order for a third-party c to be able to verify also the
signature from the peer b, the exact information over which
the peer b calculated this signature needs to be available to c.
In figure 2 at t2, for example, this information is included in
the box: the timestamp (t1) and the attribute list (HEARD).
This information has been received by a by way of TLVs, and
the signature (sign(t1, b, a, HEARD)) can be verified
by a using the identities of both routers a and b as well as
the timestamp (t1) from the timestamp TLV and the attribute
(HEARD) from the attributes TLV.
B. OLSRv2 Interaction
Due to the flexible nature of the specification of OLSRv2,
the router and link admittance control extension, presented in
this paper, can be designed as an independent module. This
module is invoked when an incoming control message has
been successfully parsed, and before further processing by
OLSRv2, as well as whenever an outgoing message is about
to be sent. This simple architecture allows combination of
other OLSRv2 extensions with this router and link admittance
control extension, without encumbering such other extensions.
The flow of incoming and outgoing messages between the
different modules is depicted in figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Message flow between NHDP, OLSRv2 and the security extension.
V. CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS
Using cryptographic signatures in control messages allows
the recipient of a message to (i) verify the integrity upon
receipt, (ii) verify if the originator is to be admitted to the
network, and (iii) verify the identity of originator of the
control message. For (i) and (ii), a “pre-shared secret”, such
as a secret passphrase or a symmetric key, suffices: only
routers possessing the secret are able to correctly sign control
messages and addresses within, which allows exclusion of “all
but pre-approved routers”. However, (iii) requires asymmetric
keys for allowing per-principal authentication. As the link
admittance control extension, presented in this paper, relies
on bi-directional verification of links between routers, per-
principal authentication is a requirement.
For assuring the reliability of the admittance control system,
it is paramount that the cryptographic keys are only acces-
sible by the router that they are allocated to. Furthermore,
it has to be ensured that the keys cannot be derived from
any information exchanged between the routers, i.e., that the
cryptographic algorithm is not vulnerable to attacks, other than
brute-force with sufficient efforts for such a brute-force attack
being appropriate for deployment requirements.
VI. TIMESTAMPS
The router and link admittance control extension can pro-
vide protection against identity-spoofing and link-spoofing of
unadmitted routers (i.e. routers not able to correctly sign
messages), but malicious routers can still record and replay
messages (see [8] for details on such “replay attacks”). These
replay attacks can be partly avoided by introducing “freshness”
information, such as timestamps or nonces, in messages. A
message which is replayed some time after the recording, can
be detected as being “old” (at least, when the clocks of the
routers are roughly synchronized).
In the protocol extension proposed in this paper, both
whole messages and individual links are candidates for “being
replayed”. Consider a router X which has been compromised
(i.e., the attacker has access to appropriate credentials to
generate correctly signed messages). If no timestamps were
included in the per-link signatures, X could record such per-
link signatures and include them later in its messages, spoofing
links to non-existing neighbors.
VII. PERFORMANCE STUDY
This section presents a performance study, by way of
simulations with NS2 [9], of the link admittance control mech-
anism, in comparison to a simple router admittance control
mechanism, both in terms of message overhead and CPU time.
Simulations have been conducted with JOLSRv2 [10] using
relatively standard scenario parameters (1km2 square, 0-300m
segments of random walk at 2-8ms , and 0-5s pause-time). The
number of routers was varied between 10 and 50, and each
value has been averaged over 20 simulation runs. The perfor-
mance parameters studied are the extra control traffic overhead
and the in-router message generation/processing overhead in-
curred by the mechanisms presented in this paper. JOLSRv2
uses AgentJ [11] for interfacing with NS2. AgentJ/NS2 per-
mits single thread execution, without preemption, allowing
instrumenting the signature generation and verification code
to record the time spent on each such operation3. For the
simulations, an Intel Core 2 CPU with 2.1 GHz and 4 GB
of RAM was used.
A. Overhead of Link Admittance Control
Using router admittance control, described in section II,
only a single signature is included per control message. Using
link admittance control, described in section III, up to two
signatures are included per advertised address. Thus, the
message size will grow with the density of the network, as
depicted in figure 5 using RSA-1024 [12], DSA-1024 [13],
ECDSA-160 [14], and HMAC-80 [15]4, with the numbers
being the key length in bits for each respective algorithm. For
RSA, DSA and HMAC, the implementations directly provided
by Java 6 have been used, whereas ECDSA is a custom
implementation.
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3For completeness: AgentJ rewrites System.currentTimeMillis()
such as to return the “simulator time”, whereas System.nanoTime() is
not rewritten and therefore returns the “wall clock time”.
4Note that HMAC, strictly speaking, is not a signature algorithm, but a
Message Authentication Code, see section V.
In the following, only ECDSA and RSA are considered
for the comparison, exploring their differences in terms of
(i) message overhead and (ii) CPU time for processing and
generating signatures.
Figure 4 depicts the cumulative overhead in the network,
due to inclusion of message signatures and address signatures.
In this figure, as well as in the following, the overhead only
considers the size of the signatures, and not the content of the
HELLO or TC message themselves. Thus, for an unsigned
message, the overhead would be 0. For the router admittance
control mechanism (denoted “RA”), the per-message overhead
is constant, and the cumulative overhead is a function of the
number of control messages – itself a function of simulation
time and number of routers. Note that the length of the control
message does not influence the length of the signature, since
the signature is always calculated over an SHA1 hash of the
message. With link admittance control (denoted “LA”), the
total overhead grows polynomial with increased number of
routers and increased density in the network, as up to two sig-
natures are added per advertised neighbor in a control message.
As RSA-1024 signatures are longer than the corresponding
ECDSA-160 signatures, the total overhead with RSA grows
considerably faster.
Using smaller signatures (e.g., as provided by ECDSA)
is, in terms of message size, particularly beneficial for link
admittance control. Longer signatures (such as RSA) leads
to (i) higher bandwidth consumption for control traffic, and
therefore (ii) higher energy consumption5, as well as (iii) the
possibility that the IP packet gets fragmented when its size
is greater than the MTU of the underlying link layer. This
can be well observed in figure 5; assuming an MTU of 1500
bytes (e.g. for Ethernet), messages signed with RSA would
be fragmented (with the associated risk of any one fragment
being lost causing the whole message to be lost) with about
five neighbors, whereas ECDSA would allow roughly three
times more neighbors.
B. In-Router Resource Requirements
This section analyses the CPU time for creating and parsing
signatures in control messages in OLSRv2 using the router
admittance and the link admittance control mechanisms re-
spectively.
Figure 6 depicts the cumulative time each router spends,
over the duration of 100 seconds, on generating signatures
in JOLSRv2, with router admittance (denoted “RA”) and
link admittance (denoted “LA”), both. For router admittance
control, the time each router spends in total on generating
signatures is constant, since every router periodically cre-
ates HELLO and TC messages, independently of the size
of the network. As expected, using link admittance control
significantly increases the amount of CPU time required for
generating control messages, since the number of signatures
per message to be generated increases with the density of the
network. ECDSA and RSA have similar time consumption for
generating signatures.
5[16] states “The energy cost of transmitting 1Kb a distance of 100 meters
is approximately 3 joules. By contrast, a general-purpose processor with
100MIPS/W power could efficiency execute 3 million instructions for the
same amount of energy”, indicating that shorter (but more computationally
intensive) signatures for certain applications, such as energy constrained
devices, may be preferential.
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Fig. 6. Cumulative time per router spent on generating message signatures.
The corresponding cumulative processing time in each
router is depicted in figure 7. Each router generates HELLOs,
which must be processed, and so its signatures verified, by its
neighbors. Thus, increasing the network density increases the
number of HELLOs that a given router receives and, therefore,
the number of signatures to verify. Depending on the network
topology and MPR selection, additional routers may also incur
additional TCs, whose processing and signature verification is
to be conducted by each other router in the network. Link
admittance control significantly increases the amount of CPU
time spent for verifying signatures for control messages. RSA
signatures are very fast to verify, while verifying ECDSA
signatures consumes a considerable amount of CPU time.
Since every signature has to be verified before it can be
forwarded, the total amount of time spent in each router for
verifying signatures is considerably higher than for generating
messages.
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Fig. 7. Cumulative time per router spent on verifying message signatures.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When OLSRv2 routers use digitally signed control mes-
sages for admittance control, these routers can verify the
identity of control message originators and the integrity of the
messages. However, a router has to trust the message originator
that the advertised links in the HELLO or TC message are
valid. This paper specifies a router and link admittance control
protocol extension to OLSRv2 , which allows a router to verify
each advertised link from incoming control messages, by
signing “both ends of the link”. The router and link admittance
control protocol extension is generic, in that it is not tied to any
specific cryptographic system. Indeed, the mechanism operates
as long as the choice of cryptographic system allows for per-
principal authentication and signature generation.
A performance study of this extension is presented, quanti-
fying the impact in terms of increased control traffic overhead
and increased per-message generation and processing time,
exemplified by using two relatively common cryptographic
systems: RSA, for its performance in verification of signatures,
and ECDSA for its short signature lengths for the same
“strength” of signatures. It is argued that using shorter signa-
tures may be advantageous when using such a router and link
admittance security mechanism, since the additional overhead
grows linear with the density of the network. Using longer
signatures leads to (i) higher bandwidth consumption for
control traffic, and therefore (ii) higher energy consumption, as
well as (iii) the possibility that the IP packet gets fragmented
when its size is greater than the MTU of the underlying link
layer.
It is observed, however, that regardless of the choice of
cryptographic system, this router and link admittance control
protocol extension is no “free lunch”: other than the size
increase in control messages, the time required for signature
generation and verification is – unsurprisingly – not negligi-
ble.
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